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1 INTRODUCTION 
In countries emerging from periods of great political turmoil, particularly 
if it has been associated with gross violations of human rights, the ques-
tion of how to deal with the past has been a crucial part of the transforma-
tion process (Sarkin 1996) Obviously, the nature of the transition plays a 
major role in determining how human rights violations of the past will be 
dealt with (Sarkin 1999). There are various models that a new state can 
use to deal with an atrocious history of human rights abuse. A common 
thread is the desire to pave the way for a future peaceful and democratic 
society. Therefore, the interests of the victims and of the community must 
be considered. 
The type of justice that is pursued is dependent on the of transition 
of which there are three broad types: overthrow, reform and compro-
mise. Being overthrown° is the fate of a regime that has refused to reform: 
opposition forces become stronger and finally topple the old order. When 
reform is undertaken," the old government plays the critical role in the 
shift to democracy. In countries where change is the result of compro-
mise," the existing regime and opposing forces are equally matched and 
cannot make the transition to democracy without each other. Such was 
the case in South Africa (Sarkin 1996; 1997; 1998) 
In Ethiopia, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia chose the 
'prosecution' model. These trials, it was believed, if successful, could play 
a part in the healing of thousands of Ethiopians whose rights were vio-
lated during the terror of the Mengistu regime or whose friends and 
relatives were killed (Mayfield 1995: I). Experiences with other war crimes 
trials, however, show that it is difficult to meet the hopes and .,v.~.,r·t"r 
of the victims during such trials (Schwarz 1994). Victims are mostly not 
involved in the trials, and are often denied the cathartic experience of a 
I I would like to thank Oliver Unseld for his researctl assistance in the writing of this 
article. 
2 See generally O'Donnell Philippe C & Whitehead 1986. 
3 As in Argemina. East Germany. Persia (now Iran) and the Philippines. 
4 As in Chile. Hungary and Spain. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
process that focuses on them as victim In isolation trials allow for recog-
nition of only a single version of events.- A truth commission, on the other 
hand, analyses various versions of events and can validate more than one 
version by accepting differing testimony and incorporating all versions 
into a report which becomes official history. While trials can help lead to 
truth, the judicial system must adhere to principles of due process and 
assignment of individual, not collective, responsibility. Trials often limit 
truth discovery. Critically, in a society in transition. the courts are often 
composed of judges from the old order. Their decisions may therefore, 
not always be responsive to the needs of the new democratic order. If 
new judges have been appointed, they may not be willing to hand down 
decisions which are too politically controversial. The standards of proof 
for conviction in a criminal trial are higher than those that must be at-
tained in a civil trial. Thus, guilty verdicts are far from certain. An acquittal 
can have a devastating effect on victims and the society in general. It 
must also be remembered that the aim of a trial is to attain a guilty ver-
dict, not to assist victims in their recovery process. There could, therefore, 
be major failings and disadvantages in the use of the criminal justice 
system in a transitional for victims of human rights abuses. 
It is in this context that Ethiopia's transition to democracy and the type of 
justice it has attempted to meet out to perpetrators of human rights abuse 
has been fascinating. It provides many lessons for other countries embark-
ing on a transitional process. This experience is also useful for the interna-
tional legal regime that is solutions [0 the problems of prosecuting 
international crimes. It provides critical insights into problems that may 
emerge as a result of the establishment of an International Criminal Court 
and the jurisdictional and other problems that may emerge between the 
court and various countries. Extremely relevant as well have been the 
attempts by the present Ethiopian government [Q bring the former ruler to 
book for his involvement in the widespread crimes which occurred during 
his reign. While the Spanish process in England to bring General Pinochet to 
triat in Spain for crimes committed in Chile was eventually unsuccessful, 
various procedural successes during the process were obtained. Ethiopia 
has however not been successful in its efforts. The former ruler has been 
given shelter in Zimbabwe since 1991 and when he came to South Africa 
in December 1999 for medical treatment, Ethiopian efforts to secure extra-
dition were frustrated by the South African government 8 Thus, while many 
believed the Pinochet example would lead to the arrest of more individuals 
6 But see Osicl (1996) on how criminal prosecurions contribute to the collective con-
sciousness and truth-telling. 
7 Various other countries are providing sanctuary (0 those accused of 
violations. Thus. Uganda's Idi Amin lives in Saudi Arabia. Haiti's Raul resides in 
Panama. Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner lives in Brazil and Haiti's death squad leader 
Emmanuel 'Toto' Constant lives in the United Stares. 
8 Amnesty International. an unfair trial in Ethiopia. did nor press for his return 
there but rather called on Africa to try him or extradite him to another country 










































ITRANSITIONALJUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION MODEL: THE EXPERIENCE OF ETHIOPIAI 
responsible for human rights abuses when they were in other countries, the 
example of Haile Mariam indicates that there may be reluctance by certain 
countries to playa pan in the politics of other countries, It may be that 
those who fear such proceedings being launched against them will seek 
assurances of safe passage from the government of the country to which 
they are travelling, In the Ethiopian example it seems as though high offi-
cials of [he South African government had given such assurances. 
2 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
From 1930 until 1991, Ethiopia's history has been dominated by two 
individuals: Haile Selassie I who became Emperor in 1930. and Mengistu 
Haile Mariam who became the ruler after Seiassie was overthrown in 
1974, 
During Haile Selassie's rule, a growing tension grew between the vari-
ous classes, He attempted to introduce a fairer tax system but was frus-
trated in these attempts by the nobility and by landowners. He attempted 
to strengthen the national government and established a national judici-
ary, In 1955, a new constitution was drafted, but the bicameral Ethiopian 
parliament and Chamber of Deputies) played no role in its draft-
ing. The constitution itself guaranteed personal freedoms and liberties, 
including due process of law. 
In spite of these changes, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the 
rate of reform. On 13 December 1960, several groups initiated an over-
throw, while Haile Selassie was abroad. The army and air force units 
remained loyal to Haile Selassie so the coup was put down. Nevertheless, 
this revolt led to further polarisation in Ethiopia. 
Thus. the last 14 years of his reign were characterised by growing op-
position, While Haile Selassie did attempt certain reforms, most attempts 
were frustrated by the need to provide grants to military and police offi-
cers. Unable to deal with the domestic issues, he turned his interest to 
foreign affairs, 
2.1 The Dergue 
The Ethiopian revolution began in early 1974, It was caused by a lack of 
reform together with rising inflation, corruption and a famine. While the 
urban-based new elite wanted to establish a parliamentary democracy, 
the revolution was initiated by the military whose conditions were poor, 
with underpaid personnel and insufficient food and other supplies. Many 
of the soldiers came from the peasantry. which was taking the brunt of 
the famine. Many believed that the government was not taking measures 
to assist the people. After the revolution a new body called the Coordi-
nating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army was 
established. It was to be known as the Dergue, Amharic for 'committee' 
Of 'council'. Major Mengistu Haile Mariam was elected chairman. Haile 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The Dergue's inFluence grew slowly and thus the political change that 
resulted has been called a 'creeping coup'. Haile Selassie was deposed and 
imprisoned on 12 September 1974 and died in prison in August 1975. 
The Dergue was not immune From criticism and was attacked by civil-
ian groups who demanded a 'people's government' Some Dergue mem-
bers lent support to these calls. A struggle took place in the organisation, 
leading to the execution of some members who supported these civilian 
demands. During this period many individuals, including various political 
prisoners, as well as. On 21 May 1991. the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa 
and took control. Mengistu fled the country (MayField 1995:1) 
2.2 The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) 
In July 1991, the EPRDF and other political and ethnic groups called a 
conference that adopted the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, which 
served as an interim Constitution. In 1992, the TGE established the Spe-
cial Prosecutor's Office to bring those responsible for human rights viola-
tions during the Dergue regime to justice. In May 1993, Eritrea became 
independent after a referendum. Elections for a constituent assembly took 
place in June 1994. The constituent assembly adopted a new constitution 
in December 1994. In 1995, Meles Zenawi's EPRDF party won the major-
ity in the first elections of the country and he became prime minister. 
However, the electoral process was not without controversy and most 
political groupings refused to participate in the process. This has caused 
ongoing problems that have been heightened by the government's poor 
human rights record (US Department of State 2000). 
Despite the fact that the new Constitution is based upon human rights 
and democracy, recent developments show that human rights are still 
violated. Thousands of critics and opponents of the government have 
been arrested, including prisoners of conscience. Even journalists were 
put into prison for articles critical of the government. More than 10 000 
people are in detention for their political opposition to the government. 
Few of them had been charged or tried. There are reports of extra-judicial 
executions. On 6 May 1998, war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
as a result of a border dispute. After this, thousands of Eritreans, most of 
them Ethiopian citizens, were deported to Eritrea (Amnesty International 
1 999a). Deportees had to abandon their homes, possessions and property 
with no guarantee of having these returned (Amnesty International 1999b). 
It is not yet clear if this development will have an impact on the trials of 
the former Dergue members and other perpetrators of human rights 
violations. Reconciliation cannot take place if Ethiopia's future is charac-
terised by internal disturbances and human rights violations. 
3 DEALING WITH THE PAST 
To prosecute those gUilty of human rights abuse, the Ethiopian TGE estab-
lished the Office of the Special Prosecutor (SPO). The mandate given to it is 
to establish for public knowledge and For posterity a historical record of the 
abuses of the Mengistu regime and to bring those criminally responsible 










































ITRANSITIONALJUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION MODEL: THE EXPERIENCE OF ETHIOPIAI 
Office of the Special Prosecutor 1995). In September 1992. the TGE 
appointed Girma Wakjira, an experienced and respected prosecutor, to 
head the SPO, but it took another four months before enough staff had 
been hired for the office to function (Mayfield 1995 III B) At the end of 
1994, there were about 30 prosecutors and 400 investigators working for 
the SPO.v Since the SPO's mandate covers a broad scope, the SPO 
planned to try the detainees in three categories: 
• urgent interim reparation 
• policy and decision makers 
• the field commanders. both military and civilian 
• the actual perpetrators of murder, torture and other crimes (Amnesty 
International 1996a:2) 
To achieve these goals the SPO created four teams. Each ream focused on 
gathering evidence for a particular abuse committed by the Mengistu 
government: the Red Terror. forced relocation. war crimes. and the 
manipulation of famine relief. 
A Fifth team was occupied with gathering evidence on the structure of 
the government, the security and military Forces. The purpose was to find 
out how this structure was used to carry out human rights violations. Two 
additional groups provided support to the work of the other groups. One 
tried to obtain all the relevant information from the government. the other 
one was charged with establishing a computer database which should 
make easily available all the collected information (MayField 1 995:III.B). [n 
Fact. the Mengisru regime documented most of its own offences very 
thoroughly. Thus, clear evidence exists for many abuses. 
Computerisation was an essential part of the SPO's to deal with 
the over 300 000 pages of documents collected, and the process created 
the first group of computer-literate prosecutors and investigators in the 
country. However, the process has been far from smooth and in fact some 
international assistance for this work has been stopped because of con-
cerns around what kind of information was being gathered and stored 
and how this was being done. 
The budget of the SPO was initially a mere $200 ODD.' However, because 
the SPO was seen to be a critical in the creation of a justice system in 
Ethiopia. the SPO received more than US$ l-million from the international 
community.'~ The international community not only provided funds but 
9 I would like to ask him why 1994. Newsweek December 19 J 9. 
10 Mayfield (1995:IIl.Bl. referring to a statement of us attorney Stuart H Deming. pub-
lished in The Economist 30 July 1994: 37·38 "Not since Nuremberg has such documen-
tary evidence been assembled suggesting the degree of complicity on the part of senior 
government officials. In many instances, there were verbatim transcripts made of criti-
cal There are over 200 volumes of these transcripts as well as audio tapes of 
many of meetings" 
I 1 Report of the Office of the SpeCial Prosecutor 1994: 564 compares the budget of US$3 
millIon In El Salvador: "This is defini£ely a difference worth noting" 
12 Zenawie's new deal. New African February 1995 at 33: Report of the Office of the 
Special Prosecuwr 57l with reference (0 the donor countries Sweden. the US. Nor-










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
also computer equipment, forensic experts for exhuming mass legal 
consultants, as well as experts for establishing a public office 
(Report of the Office of the Special Prosecutor 1995 571, 573) Although the 
SPO was given financial and organisational support, foreign exchange restric-
tions and internal bureaucratic problems severely delayed the implementa-
tion of the prosecution process (Report of the Office of the Special Prosecutor 
1995571), 
3.1 Support of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
NGOs play an important role in the work of a prosecutor or a truth com-
mission. As they monitor human rights abuses, NGOs often record of-
fences. As a result they often know the victims, as well as the 
perpetrators, and can provide essential information for a prosecution. 
However, the NGO support is very poor in Ethiopia. Given the delays and 
other problems, the international community is very sceptical about the 
ability of the SPO to comply with international standards (Report of the 
Office of the Special Prosecutor 1995: Tensions have mounted since 
certain NGOs complained about the long-term detention without trial of 
former·Dergue offiCials. The US Department of State (1995) even felt 
prompted to state that the government and human rights monitoring 
organisations had "failed completely to achieve a constructive dialog", 
3.2 Extradition of exiles 
An effective prosecution presupposes the presence of the perpetrators. 
However, many high-ranking officials of former regimes manage to flee to 
countries where they are immune from prosecution or extradition. While 
there often exists an obligation for states under international customary 
law to either prosecute or to extradite persons who allegedly committed 
crimes under international law, the practical effects of this obligation have 
often proved unsatisfactOry. A number of countries take the view that their 
national penal code is an adequate means to prosecute those criminals 
(Kalshoven 1987: 68-69). Moreover, even if countries do not prosecute 
these persons according to their national law, they often refuse to extradite 
the alleged criminals. This is the case in Zimbabwe, where PreSident Mug-
abe still refuses to extradite Mengistu. '4 For other countries the greatest 
obstacle to extradition is the fact that the fugitives would face the death 
penalty in Ethiopia. Italy, for example, will not extradite three former 
officers and ministers of the Dergue who found refuge in the compound of 
13 This concept is called "universal jurisdiction": [he requirement that criminals have to be 
punished whenever and wherever possible. even by states which had no connection 
whatsoever with the conflict in wtlich the atrocities were committed. This works by the 
principle aut dedere. aut punire. which places an obligation on any state holding an al-
leged criminal either to institute proceedings against that person itself. or to extradite 
the person to any other state which is prepared to institute proceedings. 
14 Mengistu Haile Mariam is to leave for North Korea Addis Tribune 17 March 1998. Accord-
ing to this report, Mengistu has been gramed asylum in North Korea and is expected to 










































ITR1\NSITIONALJUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION MODEL: THE EXPERIENCE OF ETHIOPIAI 
the Italian embassy in Addis Ababa. This problem is exacerbated by the 
Fact that many prisoners in Ethiopia have been sentenced to death.' 
3.3 Application of international or Ethiopian law 
Apart from the question of its duty to prosecute the offenders. Ethiopia 
had to solve the problem of whether domestic or international law should 
be applicable to the trials (Mayfield 1995:IV. BJ. The Ethiopian Penal Code' 
incorporates rules of international customary law pertaining to genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and the breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.' From the spa's point of view, the decision to use domestic 
law had several advantages. First, Article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code 
is similar to the Genocide Convention. As defined in the Genocide Con-
vention, genocide consists of acts committed "With intent to destroy. . a 
national. ethnical. racial or religious group". However, the Ethiopian 
Penal Code expands the scope of the targeted groups by incorporating 
political groups in that list. This distinction is particularly important since 
the Red Terror was directed Mengistu's political enemies (MayField 
1995:IV.B) Secondly, at the time of the establishment of the spa (1992), 
the use of international law as a basis for the prosecution of war crimes 
posed a fundamental problem. The offences of the Mengistu regime took 
place in an internal conflict, but it was not sure whether international 
customary law was applicable to those conflicts. Due to the perceived 
limitation of international rules, the only way to try the alleged perpetrators 
with war crimes was to charge them under the Ethiopian Penal Code that 
does not require war crimes to be committed in an international conflict. 
Since the decision of the International Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via in 1995 (Tadic case)"', however. the distinction between war crimes 
committed in international or non-international armed conflicts has been 
blurred more and more, and nowadays, international customary law 
covers both international and non-international war crimes.~1 
The use of domestic law offered another advantage in the eyes of the 
spa: the death penalty. While under international law it is not clear 
whether a death sentence is possible," the Ethiopian Penal Code permits 
J 5 Halien wegen Nichlauslieferung von Dergue·Verrretern an kritisien. Deutsche 
Wel/e Monitordiensl 14 January 1 Qq8. 
1 b Amnesty International J 999a: 25: "Jamal Yasin Mohamed. an Erilrean businessman. 
was executed in June in Addis Ababa's Central Prison after losing an appeal against his 
conviction for the murder of an army general in I Q77" 
I 7 Penal Code of [he Empire of Ethiopia of 1957. 
I 8 Articles 281-292 of the Ethiopian Penal Code. 
t Q Article 2 of the International Genocide Convention. 
20 The Prosecutor l'Dusko Tadir case IT·94· 1-AR72 Appeals Chamber Decision of 2 October 
1995. 
2 I Also the Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda (established by UN Security 
Council ResoiutJon 955 of 8 November 1994) contributed [0 this development in inter· 
national customary law: see in general Meron I Q95: 424. 
22 It is true that [he Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced several former members of the Nazi 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
it for first-degree homicide, genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes (Report of the Special Prosecutor t 995: 573). Since the government 
did not want to exclude the death penalty for "the demands for justice 
from victims and their relatives" (Amnesty International 1996a), the 
choice of domestic law was necessary. 
In any case, the decision to base the charges on the Ethiopian Penal 
Code prevented further delays that could have been caused by a lengthy 
debate involved in the creation of an international tribunal, such as those 
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The trials continue to be held before Ethio-
pian domestic courts. In October 1995, the court turned down the request 
of the defendants that their trials be heard by an international tribunal. 
3.4 Habeas corpus proceedings 
Shortly after the fall of the Mengisru regime in rvlay 1991, the TGE ar-
rested about 3 000 Dergue members, members of the military, various 
police officers, as well as other state suspected of direct involve-
ment or complicity in gross violations human rights during the Dergue 
period. By the time the SPO began functioning, some of these detainees 
had been detained without trial for almost 18 months. When presented 
with a habeas corpus petition, the SPO examined the evidence relating to 
that individual it had gathered until that point. If the evidence was insuffi-
cient, the SPO released the detainee on bailor unconditionally, If the SPO 
wanted to continue detention, it was able to use the Ethiopian Criminal 
Procedure Code which permitted the remand of the detainee in custody 
for up to 14 days while the authorities gather more evidence, To achieve 
this, the SPO simply had to ask a lower court for a remand order which it 
then presented to the Central High Court hearing the habeas corpus peti-
tion. This order is deemed evidence of proper detention and the court is 
not able to look into propriety of the order itself. In these circumstances 
the High Court had to dismiss the habeas corpus petition. This procedure 
could be repeated each time the SPO was confronted with such a petition 
(Mayfield 1995: IltC). 
The applications for habeas corpus did ensure that the SPO began to 
examine the lawfulness of all detentions. As a result, 900 detainees were 
released by the SPO on bail In addition, another 200 detainees were 
released from detention by the courts, As a result, the SPO gained a 
degree of credibility from the international community that saw these 
events as an expression of the SPO's commitment to the rule of law, and 
as a sign of the increasing independence of the Ethiopian judiciary. 
The downside of the habeas corpus proceedings was that they de-
manded an enormous investment of time by the SPO. Further delays in 
the pre-trial phase thus occurred, leading to some detainees spending 
even longer in detention without charge. 
---_ ... _-
23 Mayfield 1995 111.0 in general about the different possibilities to prosccUie alleged 











































ITRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION MODEL: THE EXPERIENCE OF ETHIOPIAI 
The time limit for detentions was resolved to some in late 1993, 
when the cassation (appeal) division of the Supreme Coun ruled that the 
spa was not required to bring charges within the requisite 14 days because 
of the special circumstances that existed in Ethiopia and the seriousness of 
the crimes concerned (Amnesty International 1996a: 2). There is thus no 
time limit any more. This prevents those detained from using the 
habeas corpus application. This is highly problematic as the process of trying 
all the detained individuals may take over 20 years (Report of the Special 
Prosecutor 1995: 561). 
3.5 Establishment of a Public Defender's Office (PDO) 
A public defender system has never existed in Ethiopia. During the reign 
of Haile Selassie, an ad hoc arrangement existed which saw "lawyers who 
happened to be present in the courts were asked to take on defence of 
some defendants without fee" (Report of the Special Prosecutor 1995: 573). 
According to the sPa, half of the detainees could not afford their own 
counsel (Report of the Special Prosecutor 1995: By late 1993, it 
became clear that it was necessary to establish a defence system for 
former Dergue officials who could not afford private attorneys in order to 
meet international standards (Bach 1996). Consequently, the PD~ was 
established in January 1994 together with the courts and the Danish section 
of the International Commission of Jurists (lCjDS). The PD~ is organised 
under the Central Supreme Court (now called Federal Supreme Court) and is 
headed by a Chief Public Defender and a Deputy Public Defender. 
The international donor community financed office equipment and run-
ning costs. Approximately 30 attorneys have been working in the PD~, 
among them graduates from the Law School of Addis Ababa University, 
diploma holders, and former judges in lower courts. They are paid by the 
state (Bach 1996). As of late 1997, no legislation has been enacted to 
establish the legal foundation for the PD~ (US Department of State 1997: 
Ie). Thus, the exact mandate, structure and organisation of the PD~ has 
no legal foundation (Bach 1996). 
However while there is now a structure to provide legal there are 
major problems concerning facilities to prepare such a defence. Under the 
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, it is highly problematic that attorneys 
are not given access to their clients before the trials. Moreover, they are 
not given access to the prosecution's evidence until after the evidence is 
introduced at trial (Mayfield 1995: VEl. The lack of resources is a major 
problem and those involved in the defence work demand more pay. 
3.6 The progress of the trials so far 
The speed with which the decision was taken to hold people accountable 
for human rights abuses initially won high praise for the new government 
24 Lawyers defending former Ethiopian officials demand more pay 1997. Panafrican News 
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of Ethiopia. There was therefore. in the beginning, much international 
support for the trials, and various types of assistance given to bolster the 
initiative. Opposition groups in Ethiopia have however that some 
of those being prosecuted are being targeted for political reasons (US De-
panment of State 2000). This has undermined the legitimacy of the process. 
Delays have, however, been the order of the day. While the TGE estab-
lished the SPO in August 1992, it only began to function in January 1993. 
As alleged perpetrators had already been detained for almost 18 months 
without charge, the SPO immediately started examining the lawfulness of 
the detention and those detainees who might have been in 
prison unjustly or who were involved in less serious crimes (Report of the 
Special Prosecutor 1995: 561). No SPO defendant has been released on 
bail but 33 defendants have been released for lack of evidence (US De-
partment of State 2000) 
The process the SPO followed after examining the lawfulness of the 
detentions was to begin to hear more than 2 500 witnesses, to gather 
more than 250 000 pages of documents and to analyse and enter these 
into computer databases. At the same time foreign forensic teams did 
exhumations. In October 1994. the SPO laid charges against the first 
perpetrators. At that time about 1 300 people were imprisoned (Mayfield 
1995: 111.0) While the SPO had set targets to charge all defendants by 
1994, this was not met. It was only at the end of 1996 that charges 
against 1 218 of the total I 800 detainees, were filed in Ethiopia's Federal 
High Court. Their cases were then allocated to the Supreme Court of the 
region where the crimes actually took place (Amnesty International 
1997).,5 
In February 1997, it was announced that 5 198 persons had been charged 
With acts of genOCide. A total of 2 246 were in detention (Human Rights 
Watch 1998) while the remaining 2 952 were charged in abstentia. How-
ever, it was only by 1998 that all alleged perpetrators had been indicted 
and arraigned (US Department of State 1999). 
The first trial of 73 defendants began December 1994. The court pro-
ceedings opened with the COUrt reading aloud the 269-page document of 
charges. Twenty four of the defendants were not present, including Men-
gistu, and they were tried in abstentia. The court busied itself with pre-
trial applications throughout 1995. While the prosecution case began in 
1996, the trial only gained momentum in 1997 (Amnesty International 
1996b). 
In February 1997, the investigation process was completed and charges 
were brought against 5 198 persons. In March 1997, 128 individuals were 
formally indicted on genOCide (US Department of State 2000). By the end 
of 1998, of the 5 198 persons charged, 2 246 were in detention, while the 
remaining 2 952 were charged in abstentia (US Department of State 1999: 
section I a). 
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In March 1998 the Harari Supreme Court, and in April 1998 the Oro-
miya Supreme CourL
e 
started hearing charges against former Dergue 
officials. By the end of 1998, about 550 witnesses had appeared in the 
trials (Amnesty International 1 999a) and other cases were also in prog-
ress. Trials continued in 1999 and most were still in progress by the end 
of the year, although a number of individuals have been convicted (US 
Department of State 2000) 
The courts in Ethiopia have major problems. Understaffing is one. This 
is partly the result of the government's decision to remove dozens of 
experienced judges after assuming power. It is not surprising therefore 
that the Ethiopian judiciary is believed to be "weak and overburdened" 
(Twibell 1999: 399). It is however reported by the US State Department 
that it shows "signs of independence" (Twibell 1999: 399) Thus, a severe 
shortage of trained personnel as well as financial limitations, limit the 
functioning of the judiciary. There are also resource constraints 
resulting in backlogs in the courts (Human Watch 1998). The 
problem of inexperience is recognised by the government and it is ad-
dressing the problem by boosting the training of prosecutors and judges. 
The government does, however, recognise that the process of creating an 
independent and skilled justice system will take decades (US Department 
of State 2000) 
All the trials have been characterised by years of delays. In 1999 many 
of the trials of the thousands of detainees were still being held up (Human 
Rights Watch 2000). As a result of these problems, defendants are some-
times being charged and tried collectively. Often the auorneys appointed 
by the courts are insufficiently skilled and lack As a result of 
the criticisms of these and other problems, many see these trials as being 
unfair and not leading to an impartial and objective result (US Department 
of State 1999: section 1 e). Because of all the problems, international 
support for the trials has waned over the last few years. While countries 
such as Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
the USA have committed some financial and technical assistance, the 
problems with the trials have seen this assistance dwindling. Now it 
seems that that there is a reluctance to support the trials because of a lack 
of faith in the criminal justice system to deliver fair trials and impartial 
results. The imposition of the death penalty has also affected support for 
the trials. These fears played out when Mengistu was in South Africa in 
December 1999 and Human Rights Watch, citing concerns about the 
fairness of the Ethiopian trials, declined to press for Mengistu's return to 
Ethiopia. The group suggested, however, that South Africa could try 
Mengistu before its own courts. 
Of great concern and of vital importance to victims is the fact that it is 
quite difficult to access information about the trials as little information or 
coverage is found in the media. The trial delays also limit the effect of 
26 Harari Supreme Court hears genOCide charges against Dergue officials Addis Tribune 27 
March 1998. and Oromyia Supreme Coun hears genocide charges against Dergue offi· 
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holding the trials in the first place. If a goal is to provide to victims some 
of closure, to hold people accountable for their crimes, this role is 
limited by the time it takes to hold such trials. The longer it takes, the 
more difficult it is for evidence to stand up to scrutiny, individual memory 
fades, and the interest of people wanes. The effect of' such trials cannot 
have the resonance as they would have had shortly after the transition ro 
democracy. As the delays continue, so public interest shifts to more 
immediate and pressing issues. Over time other political issues come to 
the fore. 
Experience also shows that, in general, trials often do not meet the 
hopes and expectations of victims. They are not often involved in the trial, 
and are often denied the cathartic experience of a process that focuses on 
them as victims. in isolation, trials allow for recognition of only a single 
version of events. 
While trials may help to discover the truth, the judicial system must 
adhere to principles of due process and assignment of individual albeit not 
collective, responSibility. While crucial and necessary, these fair trial right 
principles can limit discovering the truth. Critically, in a society in transi-
tion, the courts are often composed of judges from the old order. Thus, 
their decisions may not be responsive to the needs of the new democratic 
order. If new judges have been appointed, they may not be willing to 
hand down decisions that are too politically controversiaL This problem 
has been overcome in Ethiopia but other problems have come to the fore 
as a result, as mentioned above. In addition, because the standard of 
proof in a criminal trial is higher than that required in a civil one, guilty 
verdicts are far from certain. An acquittal can have a devastating effect on 
victims and the society in generaL It must also be remembered that the 
aim of a trial is 10 attain a guilty verdict rather than to assist victims in 
their recovery process, There could, therefore, be major failings and 
disadvantages in the use of the criminal justice system in a transitional 
society, 
In the Ethiopian context so far, very few substantive lessons can be 
learnt from the individual trials as the outcomes and effects are still 
largely unknown. What can be taken note of are the practical problems 
that have arisen as a result of replacing the judges, holding so many trials, 
having so few experienced lawyers, as well as other issues. It must be 
borne in mind that many of these problems are out of the control of the 
legal system and are severely impacted by resource shortages. These 
lessons are critically im ponant for other countries in similar positions, 
finanCially and otherwise, to bear in mind before embarking on the same 
treacherous road. 
4 CONCLUSION 
As can be seen through the lens of Ethiopia, a critical question for newly 
democratic countries (and for the broader international community) is 
how to deal with past gross violations of human rights. Whether there 
ought to be criminal trials is a critical decision in a country in transition. 
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be derermined whether trials are likely to deliver what is in 
terms of the needs of victims. Decisions about whether to have trials and. 
if so. who ought to be tried: or whether to pass or rescind amnesty laws; 
and whether there should be a truth commission or some similar process 
are difficult and complex. They must be taken in the context of historical. 
economic. political. social and other factors. While there is an accepted 
and majority view that, for certain crimes. international law puts a duty 
on a state to prosecute or extradite, in reality the type of justice pursued 
in a particular country is dependent on the nature of its transition. 
The amount of available resources. and competing demands for those 
resources. are also very relevant in determining whether resolving the 
past is high on a country's list of priorities. What may be relevant and 
possible in other parts of the world may not be possible in Africa. In 
addition, the manner in which change occurs and the power relations that 
continue to exist in that are important factors in these decisions. 
It is in this context that Ethiopia's transition to democracy. and the type 
of justice it has anempted to mete out to perpetrators of human rights 
abuses has been fascinating. It provides many lessons for other countries 
embarking on a transitional process. This experience is also useful for the 
international legal regime currently seeking solutions to the problem of 
prosecuting international crimes. It provides valuable insights into prob-
lems which may emerge. 
Critically. however, dealing with the past is one of the most important 
tasks of new democracies and as such cannot be avoided. 
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